This anthology brings together many of the more significant contributions to Cartesian scholarship, some of which reach far back as the 1930s. Altogether, there are well over 100 detailed analyses and discussions of salient aspects of Descartes' Promethean legacy. Because Descartes intended his system to embrace not only philosophy but also a complete scientific corpus, this collection covers both philosophical issues and scientific views: Volume 1 is devoted to questions of Cartesian Method and epistemology; Volumes 2 and 3 concentrate on (...) his metaphysics; and Volume 4 discusses Descartes' scientific views and achievements. The lucidity and originality of the essays, a number of which are already classics of Cartesian scholarship, will ensure that this anthology becomes a standard in Cartesian philosophy. An invaluable resource, Rene;e Descartes provides a large variety of introductions, analyses, criticisms, and appraisals of the problems which preoccupied Descartes and the solutions he propounded. (shrink)

Il est une question fondamentale dont il semble pourtant qu’elle n’ait pas été posée: celle de savoir ce qui fait que le cogito soit effectivement un principe métaphysique, c’est-à-dire une vérité première. Il semble aussi que ce qui d’ordinaire tient lieu de réponse à cette question dans l’esprit des lecteurs de Descartes, c’est le sentiment vague qu’il s’agit là de la première vérité qui surgisse après la dévastation laissée par le doute universel de la Première Méditation, ou peut-être qui surgisse (...) au cœur de ce doute, puisque le doute ne s’autodétruit que pour faire place à ego sumOr s’en tenir à cela pour justifier le statut de principe métaphysique du cogito, c’est confondre priorité chronologique et primauté métaphysique ou épistémique: en effet, qu’y aurait-il dans le seul fait de se présenter ainsi qui assure que le cogito doive fonder d’autres connaissances, d’éventuelles sciences? Qu’est-ce qui empêcherait aussi qu’il ne soit lui-même assujetti à d’autres connaissances, plus fondamentales, et dont le méditant ne se serait peut-être pas encore aperçu? Il est vrai que cette confusion est compréhensible, puisque la primauté métaphysique du cogito coïncide effectivement avec sa priorité dans l’ordre des connaissancesMais dans le doute ambiant, celle-ci n’est en réalité qu’un effet de celle-là, et le simple fait de constater l’une ne revient pas à être assuré de l’autre. Il ne peut s’agir donc que d’une coïncidence, et la question se pose dès lors de savoir comment se traduit sa primauté, c’est-à-dire comment doivent se concevoir ses rapports avec le reste de nos éventuelles connaissances. (shrink)

Georges J. D. Moyal - Deux notes sur l' «imparfaite science» du geometre athee - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 277-300 Deux notes sur l'« imparfaite science » du géomètre athée Georges J. D. Moyal Deux questions. La Ve Méditation de Descartes vise à démontrer que l'existence d'un Dieu vérace est la condition nécessaire de toute science. En effet, Descartes y écrit ceci : « . . . je remarque (...) que la certitude de toutes les autres choses en dépend si absolument [sc. de l'existence de Dieu], que sans cette connaissance il est impossible de pouvoir jamais rien savoir parfaitement. » Ce qui le mène, bien entendu, d'abord à reconnaître que « . . . si j'ignorais qu'il y eût un Dieu [ . . . ] je n'aurais jamais une vraie et certaine science d'aucune chose que ce soit, mais seulement de vagues et inconstantes opinions » et par là même, à refuser ensuite cette parfaite science au géomètre athée : « Or, qu'un athée puisse connaître clairement que les trois angles d'un triangle sont égaux à deux droits, je ne le nie pas ; mais je maintiens seulement qu'il ne le connaît pas par une vraie et certaine science, parce que toute connaissance qui peut être rendue douteuse ne doit pas être appelée science . . . » Il faut reconnaître qu'il y a à nos yeux, aujourd'hui, quelque chose de surprenant à ce que le géomètre athée se voie ainsi refuser cette parfaite science.. (shrink)

L'absence d'une analyse quelconque du concept de vérité a de quoi surprendre dans un discours qui se propose de dire à quelles conditions s'obtient cette vérité. C'est pourtant bien de cette carence que souffrent les Méditations. A l'exception d'une brève allusion, dans la Cinquième Méditation, attribuable d'ailleurs à Clerselier, et dans une traduction remaniée par lui mais non approuvée par Descartes, le mot « vérité » n'y est défini nulle part.

Contrairement à ce que peut suggérer l ’ expression de lumière naturelle lorsqu ’ il en est question, le cogito n ’ est pas une vérité de la raison. La raison est révoquée en doute au moment où il survient et ne saurait donc en assurer la vérité. Ce rôle est dévolu à la réflexivité de l ’ acte par lequel la pensée se constitue son propre objet lorsqu ’ elle affirme Je suis : immédiatement accessible à elle-même, c ’ (...) est une chose dans le monde, et par conséquent un existant, qu ’ elle saisit ainsi, non pas une représentation. Le cogito est ainsi inextricablement impliqué dans un acte certes, mais cet acte n ’ est pas le performatif qu ’ a voulu en faire Hintikka. La proposition qui l ’ exprime s ’ apparente en fait à une contingente : selon l ’ analyse ici proposée, il lui est en effet possible d ’ être fausse. (shrink)

Si elles ne manquent pas de bienveillance, les Quatrièmes Objections formulées par Antoine Arnauld comptent parmi les plus rigoureuses et les plus pénétrantes qui aient été opposées aux Méditations de Descartes. On sait d'ailleurs en quelle haute et chaleureuse estime Descartes tint, dès lors, le jeune théologien.

Le seul fait qu'il surgisse après que tout a été révoqué en doute ne suffit pas à faire du cogito-plus précisément, de ego sum - un principe métaphysique, une vérité première: la chose doit être démontrée. Or cette démonstration est bien là, dans la II e Méditation. Elle se fait en deux temps: y participent (a) l'expérience du morceau de cire et (b) le bref recours à l'imagination (AT VII, 27-28; IX/1, 21-22) par lequel Descartes vise à déterminer s'il est (...) davantage qu'une res cogitans. Ainsi s'explique la rémanence dans le texte de cette tentative que Descartes qualifie d' «erreur», et qui aura pu paraître redondante à ses lecteurs. (shrink)

Sixteen essays on epistemology, metaphysics, & history & politics, treating aspects of the writings of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Leibniz, & Hobbes.

This collection of essays on themes in the work of John Locke , George Berkeley , and David Hume , provides a deepened understanding of major issues raised in the Empiricist tradition. In exploring their shared belief in the experiential nature of mental constructs, The Empiricists illuminates the different methodologies of these great Enlightenment philosophers and introduces students to important metaphysical and epistemological issues including the theory of ideas, personal identity, and skepticism. It will be especially useful in courses devoted (...) to the history of modern philosophy. (shrink)

Although Kierkegaard's writings have not exerted an essential influence on canonical trends in literary criticism and theory, his work has supplied subtle and important inspiration for numerous eminent literary critics and theorists. Kierkegaard's influence transcends many polemics in literary theory—a claim justified by the fact that literary critics who draw significant examples and authority from Kierkegaard support varied and sometimes greatly conflicting philosophical and moral positions. This chapter argues that literary‐critical topics invested in Kierkegaard's texts and ideas can be grouped (...) loosely under three thematic banners: irony, repetition, and silence. These themes are often pursued with reference to Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling, respectively. The chapter discusses key examples from each of the three common themes, and indicates some of the important exceptions to this typology. (shrink)

With the exception of three articles, all of the pieces collected here by Ballard and Scott appeared in the Winter, 1970 issue of The Southern Journal of Philosophy commemorating Heidegger’s 80th birthday. The opening essay by Poeggeler, "Heidegger Today," masterfully reviews the state of Heideggerian scholarship, sketching the direction which Heidegger’s interpretations have taken, and outlining his own unitary view of Heidegger’s development. This is followed by an interesting essay from the Heidegger critic Karl Löwith who, after some revealing personal (...) recollections about Heidegger, takes up the question of the relationship of Dasein, which stands out from and transcends nature, with the natural world, a question Heidegger himself omits. There is also a close exposition by Joseph Kockelmans of the all-important "Time and Being" lecture of 1962 and of its relationship to Being and Time. Hans-Georg Gadamer contributes a philosophical essay—not a piece of Heideggerian scholarship—on the nature of "empty" time, i.e., the temporal project which we hope to "fill up," and of the "transition" into fulfillment. Editor Scott gives an account of Dasein in Being and Time by an analogy with Leibniz’s monad as a self-originating, purposeful unit of activity. Theodore Kisiel differentiates the mathematical a priori, described by Heidegger as the root conception of modern science, from Heidegger’s own "hermeneutical" a priori. There are three studies of language: Volmann-Schluck discusses language and myth, while John Sallis studies how language and the reversal are intertwined in Heidegger’s thinking; Don Ihde differentiates "existential" phenomenology as a phenomenology of perception from "hermeneutic" phenomenology as a phenomenology of meaning, signification, and language. In addition to essays by A. V. Schoenborn, F. J. Smith, and Edward Ballard, there is also a concluding contribution by Jean Beaufret who offers a portrait of Heidegger "as seen from France."—J.D.C. (shrink)

This essay is meant to shed light on a discourse that spans centuries and includes different voices. To be aware of such trans-textual resonances can add a level of historical understanding to the reading of philosophical texts. Specifically, we intend to demonstrate how the notion of the ineffable Dao 道, prominently expressed in the Daodejing 道德經, informs a long discourse on incongruent names in distinction to a mainstream paradigm that demands congruity between names and what they designate. Thereby, we trace (...) the development of the idea of the ineffable Dao quite differently from modern mystical interpretations. We show how, in an early Chinese context, it first gives rise to a sociopolitical critique of the incongruity underlying socially constructed names in the Zhuangzi 莊子, then to a discourse on the incongruity between moral virtues and names in Xuanxue 玄學 philosophy, and eventually to Sengzhao’s 僧肇 claim that a perceived congruence of names with things does not entail actual congruence between names and reality. (shrink)

David Hoy’s book is a readable and generally clear introduction to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and to the contemporary debate surrounding Gadamer’s contribution to the theory of interpretation. Hoy begins with a chapter on a work familiar to American readers and antithetical to Gadamer—E. D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation. Hirsch is shown to be in some respects a follower of the hermeneutics of Schliermacher and Dilthey in that his defense of authorial intention approximates the "empathy" of nineteenth-century hermeneutics. Hoy (...) makes a careful analysis of the problems involved in Hirsch’s distinction between "meaning"—"the meaning of [an author’s] utterance is the meaning he wills to convey" —and significance—the relation between meaning and some other, extra-textual, element or system. Hoy properly questions the view of language inherent in Hirsch’s contention that verbal meaning is entirely determined by an individual will. He notes that Hirsch neglects meaning determined by the semantics of units of text larger than the sentence. Hoy also argues persuasively that Hirsch’s claim to base his meaning/significance distinction in Frege’s opposition between Sinn and Bedeutung constitutes a misreading of Frege, and shows an ambiguity in Hirsch’s conception of the author, sometimes presented as an historical being with a will and intention and at others as the equivalent of the persona or dramatic speaker of the New Critics. (shrink)

More and more, we present ourselves and encounter others through profiles. A profile shows us not as we are seen directly but how we are perceived by a broader public. As we observe how others observe us, we calibrate our self-presentation accordingly. Profile-based identity is evident everywhere from pop culture to politics, marketing to morality. But all too often critics simply denounce this alleged superficiality in defense of some supposedly pure ideal of authentic or sincere expression. This book argues that (...) the profile marks an epochal shift in our concept of identity and demonstrates why that matters. You and Your Profile blends social theory, philosophy, and cultural critique to unfold an exploration of the way we have come to experience the world. Instead of polemicizing against the profile, Hans-Georg Moeller and Paul J. D’Ambrosio outline how it works, how we readily apply it in our daily lives, and how it shapes our values—personally, economically, and ethically. They develop a practical vocabulary of life in the digital age. Informed by the Daoist tradition, they suggest strategies for handling the pressure of social media by distancing oneself from one’s public face. A deft and wide-ranging consideration of our era’s identity crisis, this book provides vital clues on how to stay sane in a time of proliferating profiles. (shrink)

The past few years have seen a dramatic backlash against identity politics from academics such as Michael Sandel, Kwame Appiah, Mark Lilla, and Francis Fukuyama. In the vocabulary of identity conceptions, we can classify this as a reaction to a growing dissatisfaction with the perceived hollowness and ineffectiveness of “authenticity” that calls for a return to “sincerity”—or a “Political New Sincerity.” We argue that a third identity paradigm is in play as well, namely “profilicity.” This profile-based approach to understanding oneself, (...) others, and the world has had a major impact on social and political life, and yet has gone largely unnoticed or otherwise been mis-diagnosed. Our analysis provides a critical reflection on the emergence of profilicity to pave the way for developing insights into our changing sociopolitical and inter-personal landscapes. (shrink)

Moral leadership matters. As world politics enters a new and dangerous era, judgment, constancy, moral purpose, and a willingness to overcome partisan politicking are essential for America's leaders. Tempered Strength finds the alternative standard of leadership that Americans are seeking in the classical philosophy of prudence. Ethan Fishman's new work brings together leading American political scientists—including Ronald Beiner, Kenneth L. Deutsch, and George Anastaplo—to discuss the evolution of a standard of prudential leadership both reasonable in nature and practical in scope. (...) Section One studies the meaning of prudence and its evolution in the history of political science from Aristotelian phronesis to Xenophon, Thomas Aquinas, Edmund Burke, and Michael Oakeshott. Section Two demonstrates how the theory of prudential leadership can be applied to practical political issues. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide a preliminary outline of a theory of identity. The first section addresses what the sociologist Niklas Luhmann has called ‘the problem of identity’, or, in other words, the mind–society (rather than the mind–body) problem: In how far can the internal (psychological) self and the external (social) persona be integrated into a unit? The second section of the essay briefly defines a basic vocabulary of a theory of identity. ‘Identity’ is understood as the existentially necessary formation (...) of a coherence between the ‘self’ (the ‘I’ as it is experienced in thoughts and feelings), its body and its social ‘persona’ (the individual person with its social attributes). Three different major paradigms of identity formation are distinguished from one another: a sincere identity is constructed through a firm commitment of the self to its social roles; an authentic identity is constructed through the creation of a social persona on the basis of one’s unique and original self; a ‘profilic’ identity, as we call it, is shaped by successfully presenting a personal profile under conditions of second-order observation as they prevail, for instance, in the social media, but also in other contemporary social systems. In the third section of the essay, we present a sketch of the historical sequence of these three paradigms of identity. Although these paradigms are not mutually exclusive and can coexist, it seems that sincerity flourished in pre-modern society, while authenticity came to prominence along with the functional differentiation of modern society and is now, along with the increased significance of second-order observation, gradually overshadowed by the influence of profilicity. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of essays by various contributors in honor of the late Laurence Berns, Richard Hammond Elliot Tutor Emeritus at St. John's College, Annapolis. The essays address the literary, political, theological, and philosophical themes of his life's work as a scholar, teacher, and constant companion of the "great books.".